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CHALLENGING SOLICITATION STATUTES AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: APPELLATE BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
IN YPSILANTI v. PATTERSON
Lore A. Rogers*
INTRODUCTION
On July 28, 199o, Ms. Willie Mae Patterson and her fianc6, Mr.
Carlton Burks, were driving home after enjoying the summer weather
at Frog Island Park in Ypsilanti, Michigan. On the way into town, the
car they were driving began to sputter and then broke down in front of
a church on North Adams Street.' Mr. Burks attempted to re-start the
car, without success. He then looked under the hood to try to locate
the source of the problem, again without success. 2 Finally, Mr. Burks
managed to push the car to the side of the curb where he and Ms.
Patterson began discussing what they should do.3 Ms. Patterson decided
to try to flag some help.4
Ms. Patterson got out of the car and walked down the street to
find a friend who might be able to help start the car.5 On her way back
down the street toward the car, she saw two male friends driving by,
one an old classmate.6 She waved to them to get them to stop, and
Lore A. Rogers (J.D. 1983, University of Michigan Law School) is an attorney with
her own firm, Law Firm of Lore A. Rogers, P.C., in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Lore
Rogers served for several years as co-chair of the Race, Gender, and Ethnic Bias
Committee of the Washtenaw County Bar Association and serves on the Board of
Directors at Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Michigan. She is also on the Board of
Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washtenaw County and the
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the Mary E. Foster Award from the Women Lawyers Association of Michigan,
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1. Record at 24, People of the City of Ypsilanti v. Willie Mae Patterson, No.
CR-14A-2-90-1478 (Mich. Dist. Ct. July 15, 1991).
2. Record at 25.
3. Record at 25-26.
4. Record at 26, 34.
5. Record at 34.
6. Record at 40.
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asked if they had jumper cables. 7 The men did not have cables, and
continued on their way after speaking briefly with Ms. Patterson.8 After
returning to the car for a brief rest, Ms. Patterson walked down Adams
Street to call her father, who lived a few blocks away, for assistance
with the car.9 Her father was not home at the time, so Ms. Patterson
walked back toward the car.10 Soon after that, Ms. Patterson recognized
her brother driving on Michigan Avenue, coming toward Washington
Street.'1 Ms. Patterson waved to her brother, but before she could get
his attention, she was surrounded by five or six police cars. 12
Ypsilanti Police Officer Mutchler arrested Ms. Patterson for loiter-
ing for the purposes of soliciting sexual acts for hire. This arrest oc-
curred as Officer Mutchler carried out his assigned task for the evening:
doing surveillance in "the downtown area" for general crimes and
prostitution. 13 His supervisor had directed him there to clamp down on
"an influx of known prostitutes working in the area." 14
Prior to the arrest, Officer Mutchler had been sporadically watch-
ing Ms. Patterson and Mr. Burks with binoculars while in a squad car
"hidden" away, sometimes in an alley, sometimes in a church parking
lot. 15 Both the alleyway and the lot were at least a half-block's distance
from Ms. Patterson. 16 Officer Mutchler was unable to hear any con-
versations between Ms. Patterson and Mr. Burks or between Ms. Pat-
terson and her friends who stopped to assist her.' 7 Further, Mutchler's
surveillance of Ms. Patterson was not constant.' 8 Between the hours of
seven and nine o'clock p.m., Mutchler "wasn't stationary," but "kept
circling the block."19 At times during that two hour period, Mutchler
was "watching other people," so that "[t]here were some periods of time
7. Record at 34.
8. Record at 34.
9. Record at 36.
10. Record at 36.
n. Record at 34.
12. Record at 40.
13. Record at 7.
14. Record at 7.
15. Record at 18.
16. Record at 18.
17. Record at 16, 17.
18. Record at 12.
19. Record at 16.
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she [Ms. Patterson] was out of sight."20
Officer Mutchler was prompted to arrest Ms. Patterson by his
alleged observation of her "type of walk, the manner of dress, the
behavior entering and exiting vehicles, leaving and coming back with
different men" and based on the fact that he had previously arrested
Ms. Patterson for soliciting.21
Based on this evidence, the trial judge found Ms. Patterson guilty
of violating Ypsilanti's law prohibiting loitering for the purpose of
soliciting sexual activity for hire.
The following argument from Defendant-Appellant's Brief on
Appeal presented a facial and an "as applied" constitutional challenge to
Ypsilanti's "Loitering for Purpose of Engaging in Prostitution" or-
dinance.22 Section 9.138 of the Ypsilanti City Code provided:
(I) For purposes of this section:
(a) [Public place] means any street, sidewalk, bridge, alley
or alleyway, plaza, park, driveway, parking lot or
transportation facility or the doorways or entrance ways
to any building which fronts on any of the aforesaid
places or a motor vehicle in or on any such place.
(b) [Known prostitute or panderer] means a person who,
within a year previous to the date of arrest for a violation
of this section, has, within the knowledge of the arresting
officer been convicted of violating this section or any
other section of the City Code or the State Statutes relat-
ing to prostitution, solicitation or procurement.
(z) No person shall remain or wander about in a public
place and repeatedly beckon to, or repeatedly attempt to
engage passersby in conversation, or repeatedly stop or at-
tempt to stop motor vehicles, or repeatedly interfere with the
free passage of other persons, for the purpose of engaging in,
soliciting, or procuring sexual activity for hire. The cir-
cumstances which may be considered in determining whether
such purpose is manifested are: That such person is a known
prostitute or panderer, repeatedly beckons to, stops or at-
tempts to stop, or engages passersby in conversation, or
repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators
20. Record at 12.
21. Record at 14.
22. YPSILANTI, MICH., CITY CODE § 9.138 (1990-91).
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by hailing, waving of arms or any other bodily gestures.23
Appellant successfully contended that the ordinance, on its face,
violates both the Michigan and Federal Constitutions and thus was void
and unenforceable. Further, Appellant contended that her arrest and
conviction under the ordinance was unconstitutional. In this regard, it
is important to understand the elements of this ordinance and what it
did and did not prohibit. This particular ordinance did not criminalize
the actual act of soliciting or engaging in sexual activity for hire.
Rather, this ordinance prohibited being in a public place with the
purpose or intent of soliciting or engaging in a sexual act for hire.
In an opinion and order setting aside the conviction, Judge Melin-
da Morris of the circuit court for Washtenaw County found the or-
dinance was "a short-cut which violates constitutional rights."24 Hold-
ing that it is within the police power of the state to proscribe conduct
that has as its goal the completion of criminal acts such as prostitution
and solicitation, the court nevertheless found that such a goal must be
accomplished through the laws of attempt. As a result, the ordinance
was found unconstitutional on its face as overbroad and vague. Further,
the circuit court held that the circumstances to be used in determining
the purpose of the conduct, a prior conviction, is inadmissible evidence
under the Michigan Rules of Evidence.25
ARGUMENT
I. THE YPSILANTI ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE
BECAUSE IT CREATES AN UNJUSTIFIABLE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT
AND PUNISHES A PERSON BASED ON HIS/HER STATUS, IN CON-
TRAVENTION OF THE I4TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CON-
STITUTION AND ART. I, SEC. 17 OF THE MICHIGAN CONSTITU-
TION.
There are two circumstances recited in the Ypsilanti ordinance which
"may' be considered in determining whether a purpose to solicit or
engage in prostitution has been manifested by someone in a public
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. City of Ypsilanti v. Willie Mae Patterson, No. 91-26138-AR, slip op. at 13 (Mich.
Cir. Cr. Feb. 4, 1993).
25. City of Ypsilanti v. Willie Mae Patterson, No. 91-26138-AR, slip op. at 13 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 4, 1993).
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place: 1) the person is a "known prostitute or panderer";26 and 2) the
person repeatedly beckons to or attempts to stop or engage passers-by
in conversation or repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle
operators.27 If this provision of the ordinance is read literally, then these
are the only circumstances which may be considered in determining
whether or not a person is in a public place with the purpose of engag-
ing in or soliciting prostitution.
The ordinance does not expressly state that other circumstances
may be considered or that the enumerated circumstances are by way of
example only. Rather, the ordinance states, "[tihe circumstances which
may be considered in determining whether such purpose is manifested
are . . "28 It does not say "[almong the circumstances which may be
considered," 29 as was the case in the ordinance at issue in Short v. City
of Birmingham,30 nor does it say "[c]ircumstances which may be con-
sidered include but are not limited to,"31 as did the ordinance which was
under consideration in Christian v. Kansas City.32 In those two cases, it
was clear that the legislative body which passed those ordinances in-
tended that the enumerated circumstances would not be exhaustive or
inclusive. However, the Ypsilanti ordinance is significantly different
from those ordinances. The only conclusion which can be drawn is that
the Ypsilanti City Council intended that these circumstances be the only
circumstances which may be considered in determining whether this
crime has been committed, i.e., whether a person is in a public place
with the purpose of soliciting or engaging in prostitution.
A. The Ypsilanti Ordinance Creates an Unjustifiable
Presumption of Guilt.
If the ordinance is construed as allowing an officer, judge, or jury to
find that a person in a public place is gesturing for the purpose of
engaging in or soliciting prostitution, based solely on whether the
person is a "known prostitute or panderer" who is in a public place or
who repeatedly beckons or gestures to passers-by or motor vehicles,
26. YPSILANTI, MICH., CITY CODE § 9.138 (1990-91).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GENERAL CODE § 11-7-33(b) (1980) (emphasis added).
30. 393 So. 2d 518, 520 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981).
31. KANSAS CITY, Mo., REVISED ORDINANCES § 26.161 (c)(1977) (emphasis added).
32. 710 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam).
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then the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. This construction
creates an unjustifiable presumption of guilt based on a prior arrest or
conviction for prostitution.33
In the instant case, the ordinance effectively makes it criminal for
a "known prostitute" (i.e., one who has been convicted of prostitution
within the previous year) to stand in a public place and gesture to
others. The City denies that this is the result or the purpose of the
ordinance, contending that the ordinance does not make it illegal to
gesture, but makes it illegal to gesture to others with a specific purpose.
However, the only elements which may be considered in determining
whether the criminal purpose exists are the status of the person and the
act of gesturing. Accordingly, the dispositive element in determining
whether or not such a purpose has been manifested is the status of the
person (since gesturing is already a separate element of the offense).
Thus, the status of the person as a known prostitute or panderer be-
comes the element of the crime. For the purposes of the ordinance, the
"act" plus the "status" equals a "violation."
An ordinance making the status of a prostitute an element of a
crime was struck down as unconstitutional by the Michigan Court of
Appeals in City of Detroit v. Bowden.34 In Bowden, the court was
presented with a constitutional challenge to a City of Detroit ordinance
which provided as follows:
It shall be unlawful for a known prostitute or panderer to
repeatedly stop or attempt to stop any pedestrian or motor
vehicle operator by hailing, whistling, waving of arms or any
other bodily gesture in or upon any public sidewalk, street,
alley, park or public place.
And [sic] person violating the provisions of this section
shall be deemed a disorderly person and shall, upon convic-
tion, be punished as herein provided. For purposes of this
section "a known prostitute or panderer" is any female or
33. The trial court did rule that evidence that a person arrested under the ordinance
was a "known prostitute" was not admissible at trial unless otherwise admissible
under the Michigan Rules of Evidence. However, the trial court implicitly held that
the ordinance could be constitutionally construed to allow an arresting officer and
the trier of fact to consider as evidence of guilt circumstances which are not
enumerated in the ordinance. Since this Court may determine that the ordinance
may not be construed in that manner, Appellant continues this argument in order
to preserve it on appeal.
34. 149 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967).
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male who, within two years from date of arrest for violation
of this section, has been convicted of prostitution, accosting
and soliciting, receiving and admitting, abetting and abiding,
maintaining and operating or pandering, as those crimes are
defined by the laws of the State.3 5
The Court of Appeals struck down this ordinance on due process
grounds, holding that its definition of known prostitute or panderer
created an unjustifiable presumption of guilt which denied persons with
a past conviction a fair opportunity to rebut the charges against them.3 6
The court stated:
The ultimate issue in a violation of the ordinance is whether
the accused was, in fact, soliciting when she waved. The
plaintiff argues that it is difficult to produce evidence of street
solicitation without the language which amended this or-
dinance. This difficulty of proof without the "conclusive
presumption" that one who has been convicted of such a
crime within the last two years is a "known prostitute," will
not justify the amendment. Neither will calling the proof of this
conviction an element of the crime cure the constitutional infir-
mity. As it is not permissible to shift the burden of proof to
the defendant, so it is also not permissible to strip her of all
defense because of her prior conviction. The amendment to
the ordinance fails to meet the test of due process under both
the Michigan and the United States Constitutions.37
The holding in Bowden is controlling with respect to the Ypsilanti
ordinance at issue in the instant case. As noted above, the Ypsilanti
ordinance effectively makes being a known prostitute or panderer an
element of the crime. The court in Bowden expressly held that an
ordinance with such an element must be struck down as unconstitu-
tional. Accordingly, the Ypsilanti ordinance must be struck down as
being violative of an individual's due process rights.
35. DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCE ch. 39, art. I, § 52 (1965).
36. Bowden, 149 N.W.2d at 776.
37. Bowden, 149 N.W.2d at 776 (emphasis added).
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B. The Ypsilanti Ordinance Unconstitutionally Penalizes a
Person Because of His/Her Status.
Additionally, or alternatively, Ypsilanti's ordinance is unconstitutional
because it punishes a person based on his or her status as a known
prostitute or panderer. In Robinson v. California,38 the United States
Supreme Court struck down a law which made it a crime to be a drug
addict, holding that such a law was violative of an individual's
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.39 While the Ypsilanti or-
dinance does not expressly make it a crime to be a known prostitute or
panderer, it does make it a crime to be a known prostitute or panderer
who gestures to others in a public place. Such an ordinance was found
to be unconstitutional in Profit v. City of Tulsa4° where the court held:
Status alone is generally insufficient to constitute a crime.
It is clear from a careful reading of the ordinance that mere
status as a prostitute or pimp is not made criminal by this
ordinance. It is equally clear, however, that the ordinance does
make criminal certain acts, -innocent in and of themselves, if done
by a "known prostitute or known pimp." Although the or-
dinance tends to regard "status" as a circumstance indicating
the intent of a person loitering, plainly the circumstance can
control whether the ordinance has been violated In this sense,
"status" becomes not the offense but, rather, an element of the
offense.
Whether status is the offense or whether it is merely an
element thereof is irrelevant. The ordinance suffers from the
same constitutional infirmities in either case. A person should
be convicted only for what he does, not for what he is.41
The reasons stated by the court in Profit are equally applicable
here, particularly in light of the Michigan Court of Appeals' ruling in
Bowden. Ypsilanti's "loitering for purposes of prostitution" ordinance
attempts to punish people for what they are, not what they do. For this
reason, Ypsilanti's ordinance must be found unconstitutional, since it
punishes the status of the offender, rather than any actual criminal acts
38. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
39. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
40. 617 2d 250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1.980) (emphasis added) (citations omitted),
41. Profit, 617 2d at 251.
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performed by the offender.
II. THE YPSILANTI ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE
BECAUSE IT IS OVERBROAD AND VAGUE AND RESTRICTS
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY.
A. Ypsilanti's Ordinance is Overly Broad in Scope and
Threatens Innocent Conduct.
In Johnson v. Carson,42 the United States District Court struck down as
unconstitutional a city ordinance which made it unlawful "for any
person to loiter in or near" any public place under circumstances
manifesting the purpose of engaging in or soliciting prostitution.43 In
so holding, the court held that such an ordinance clearly involved and
inhibited the First Amendment freedoms of the public, specifically stat-
ing:
The ordinance appears to prohibit various activities such
as a "known prostitute" loitering on a street corner, anyone
repeatedly engaging passers-by in conversation and anyone
repeatedly attempting to stop cars by waving their arms.
Thus, in the present case, as in Sawyer:
The "protected freedom" involved in this case is the
first amendment guarantee of freedom of associa-
tion. This right to freely associate is not limited to
those associations which are "political in the cus-
tomary sense" but includes those which "pertain to
the social, legal, and economic benefit of the
members." "The rights of locomotion, freedom of
movement, to go where one pleases, and to use the
public street in a way that does not interfere with the
personal liberty of others" are implicit in the [FJirst
and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments.
The Sawyer court went on to conclude that even associating
on the street corner is constitutionally protected .... Loiter-
ing, loafing, and habitually wandering at night are also con-
stitutionally protected. Since [the Jacksonville ordinance]
prohibits these rights in certain circumstances, the first
42. 569 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
43. Id. at 976 (construing JACKSONVILLE, FLA., MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE § 330.107
(1991)).
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amendment is involved in the present case. Although speech
incident to soliciting for prostitution is not protected by the
first amendment ... [the Jacksonville ordinance] does not
appear to stop at prohibiting such speech. In fact, to violate
[the Jacksonville ordinance], a person need not actually solicit
or speak to anyone.44
As in Johnson, the Ypsilanti loitering for purposes of prostitution
ordinance under consideration indisputably involves and restricts First
Amendment freedoms. Significantly, the ordinance makes it a criminal
act to engage passers-by in conversation or to beckon to passers-by or
attempt to stop motor vehicle operators, if such is for the purpose of
soliciting an act of prostitution or engaging in prostitution. As in
Johnson, a person need not actually solicit someone in order to be
found to have violated the ordinance. Rather, all a person need do is
engage in gesturing, talking, or other modes of communication-all
behavior which is typically innocent and which is protected by the free
speech provisions of the Federal and Michigan constitutions.
45
It is one of the strong tenets of constitutional law that a statute
which restricts or burdens the exercise of First Amendment freedoms
must be carefully scrutinized:
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment
needs breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict
or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be
narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judg-
ment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to
other compelling needs of society....
. . . Overbreadth attacks have also been allowed where the
Court thought rights of association were ensnared in statutes
which, by their broad sweep, might result in burdening in-
nocent associations. 46
In analyzing a claim of overbreadth, i.e., that the Ypsilanti or-
dinance unconstitutionally restricts or burdens First Amendment
freedoms, this court first must determine whether a limiting construc-
tion can be placed on the ordinance so that there is not a burden on a
44. Johnson, 569 E Supp. at 976 (quoting Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 E2d 311 (5th
Cir. 1980) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I; MIcH. CoNsr. art. 1, b 5.
46. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-1 :1973) (citations omitted).
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person's First Amendment rights.47 In the instant case, no such con-
struction is possible, since the ordinance clearly and intentionally in-
cludes as an element of the crime acts of expression which are innocent
in and of themselves.
In Christian v. Kansas City,48 the Missouri court was faced with an
ordinance virtually identical to the Ypsilanti ordinance. That court
struck down the Missouri ordinance as unconstitutionally overbroad,
stating:
If the circumstances which allegedly reflect one's illicit inten-
tions were held to be well grounded in constitutional
jurisprudence, this court would have to condone potential
arrests and convictions for behavior that Americans freely and
innately enjoy: window shopping, waiting on the corner for a
bus, waving to friends, or hailing a taxi cab....
... This court cannot visualize a "substantial number" of
fact patterns where this ordinance would be constitutionally
applicable preventing an attack based on facial overbreadth.
Nor can this court devise a limiting construction to cure its
deficiencies. 49
Similarly, in Johnson, the court ruled that the Jacksonville or-
dinance which prohibited loitering for purposes of prostitution was
unconstitutionally overbroad. 50 Likewise, in Profit, the court did not
hesitate to find that a loitering for the purposes of prostitution or-
dinance was unconstitutionally overbroad:
Under the present ordinance the act or acts required to be
done in conjunction with being a known prostitute or pimp
are otherwise not criminal in most situations. The ordinance
reaches beyond conduct which is calculated to harm and could be
used to punish conduct which is essentially innocent. We find this
ordinance is overbroad. It could be used to punish the mere act of
waving or calling out to a friend.51
47. Johnson, 569 F Supp. at 977.
48. 710 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (per curium).
49. Christian, 710 S.W.2d at 13-14 (construing KANSAS CITY, Mo., RmWSED OR-
DINANCES § 26.161 (1911) (citations omitted)).
50. Johnson, 569 F Supp. at 980.
51. Profit v. City of Tulsa, 617 P.2d 250, 251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). See also Hayes v. Municipal Court of Oklahoma City,
487 P.2d 974, 978-81 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (discussing and applying the
1993]
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The fact that an innocent person who is arrested might ultimately
be found "not guilty" does not raise the Ypsilanti ordinance to a con-
stitutional level with respect to scope and breadth. In Johnson the court
noted that simply the possibility of arrest is an unconstitutional deterrent
to the free exercise of first amendment freedoms:
Even if a person explains his or her conduct and the trial
court ultimately believes the explanation and a lawful purpose
is disclosed, the person's first amendment rights have, none-
theless, been chilled by the arrest. In Papachristou, the Jack-
sonville ordinance made it unlawful for certain types of
persons to wander or stroll "around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object." The Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he qualification 'without any lawful purpose or
object' may be a trap for innocent acts." . . .
Similarly, in the present case, the possibility of arrest
deters the free exercise of first amendment rights.52
In sum, the Ypsilanti ordinance unreasonably burdens the lawful
exercise of the First Amendment rights of speech and association. Be-
cause it does so, it must fall.
B. The Ypsilanti Ordinance is Unconstitutionally Vague.
In Grayned v. City of Rockford,53 the Supreme Court provided a concise
discussion of the grounds on which laws will be found to be vague and
violative of an individual's due process rights:
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is
void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary in-
telligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,
overbreadth doctrine to a general loitering statute).
52. Johnson, 569 E Supp. at 979 (construing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (citations omitted)).
53. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy mat-
ters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of ar-
bitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related,
where a vague statute "abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the ex-
ercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably
lead ... citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone'
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked." 54
Thus, in order for the Ypsilanti ordinance to be constitutional, it
must:
I) give a person reasonable notice of what acts are
prohibited;
2.) provide explicit standards for application and enforce-
ment; and
3) not infringe upon the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms.
In the instant case, Ypsilanti's loitering for purposes of prostitution or-
dinance violates all three requirements.
1. The Ypsilanti Ordinance Does Not Provide
Reasonable Notice of What Acts Might Subject
a Person to Arrest and Conviction.
The elements of Ypsilanti's ordinance are: 1) loitering and gesturing;
and 2) with the purpose of soliciting or engaging in prostitution.5 5 The
City argues that this ordinance is not vague, because a person of ordi-
nary sense knows whether or not he or she is loitering or gesturing with
an "intent" or "purpose" of engaging in prostitution. Such an argument
has some surface-level appeal, but it misses the point. The problem
with the ordinance is that the purpose which makes the activity unlaw-
ful is determined solely by the acts or the status of the person subject to
the ordinance-acts or status which are just as likely to be innocent of
wrongdoing as they are to be manifestations of guilt.
54. Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted).
55. YPsIlAIM, MICH., CITr CODE § 9.138 (1990-91).
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The former prostitute-turned-streetside-preacher, the graduate
student conducting research, or the woman repeatedly asking passers-by
if they have seen the friend she is waiting for, are all subject to arrest
under this ordinance.56 They may know they are not acting for the
purpose of soliciting/engaging in prostitution, but they have no way of
anticipating or knowing what the police will surmise. An opinion from
the Michigan Court of Appeals in a search and seizure case aptly
describes the flaw in the Ypsilanti ordinance:
The difficulty is that from the viewpoint of the observer,
an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty move-
ment. He must not only perceive the gesture accurately, he
must also interpret it in accordance with the actor's true in-
tent. But if words are not infrequently ambiguous, gestures
are even more so. Many are wholly nonspecific, and can be
assigned a meaning only in their context. Yet the observer
may view that context quite otherwise from the actor: not
only is his vantage point different, he may even have ap-
proached the scene with a preconceived notion-consciously
or subconsciously-of what gestures he expected to see and
what he expected them to mean. The potential for
misunderstanding in such a situation is obvious. 57
Under the Ypsilanti ordinance, the ordinary person must guess as
to what behaviors he/she must adopt, or what gestures and acts he/she
must avoid and in what areas, in order to prevent an overzealous police
officer from arresting them under the ordinance. In Johnson the court
ruled that a virtually identical Florida ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague for this very reason:
Florida courts construe [the ordinance] to include two
elements-loitering and behavior manifesting a purpose re-
lated to prostitution. The ordinance goes on to specify what
56. To the extent that the City's response is: "Nonsense! Our police know a prostitute
when they see one," or, "The police will be relying on other well-known criteria for
determining intent, beyond that which is set out in the ordinance," then the City's
response only further serves to demonstrate the vagueness of the ordinance under
the second standard discussed in Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09. For further discus-
sion see infira, part II.B.2.
57. People v. Young, 282 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting People v
Super. Ct. of Yolo County, 478 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1970)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
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conduct satisfies the second element. Thus it is arguable that
the ordinance is specific in what it proscribes. But can it say
with certainty that a person convicted in any state within the
past year of a prostitution-related offense would know that he
could be arrested under [the ordinance] for merely wandering
aimlessly? Would a political candidate, a motorist in distress, or a
member of a religious group realize that repeatedly waving to cars
passing by could subject him or her to arrest? 58
For this reason, Ypsilanti's loitering for purposes of prostitution or-
dinance is unconstitutionally vague and may not be enforced.
2. The Ypsilanti Ordinance is Subject to Arbitrary
and Discriminatory Enforcement.
A law "must provide explicit standards for those who apply them."59 In
Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville,6° the United States Supreme Court
struck down a loitering statute (which made unlawful, among other
things, loitering "without any lawful purpose"), noting:
We allow our police to make arrests only on "probable cause,"
a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to
the States as well as to the Federal Government. Arresting a
person on suspicion, like arresting a person for investigation,
is foreign to our system, even when the arrest is for past
criminality....
A direction by a legislature to the police to arrest all
"suspicious" persons would not pass constitutional muster.61
The Ypsilanti ordinance effectively allows police to arrest persons
on suspicion, rather than on probable cause. The whole tenor of the
ordinance appears to be: "If we can't catch them in the act of soliciting,
then we'll catch them for being in the area for the purpose of soliciting."
This nip-it-in-the-bud approach to law enforcement is the antithesis of
due process.
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or
58. Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974, 980 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (emphasis added).
59. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
60. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
61. Id. at 169 (citations omitted).
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loiter or stroll or frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who
are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the
police are to become future criminals is too precarious for a
rule of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized
vagrancy standards-that crime is being nipped in the
bud-is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of
course vagrancy statutes are useful to police. Of course, they
are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables.
But the rule of law implies equality and justice in its applica-
tion.62
Of additional importance is the Supreme Court's recognition in
Papachristou that laws like the Ypsilanti ordinance are most likely to
affect those who are least able to understand it or to defend themselves
against it:
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the
ordinance-poor people, non-conformists, dissenters, idlers-
may be required to comport themselves according to the
lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the
courts. Where, as here, there are no standards governing the
exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the
scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient
tool for "harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local
prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit
their displeasure." 63
The Ypsilanti ordinance allows individual officers to pick and
choose whom they will arrest, without restriction (particularly if the
ordinance is construed such that the two enumerated circumstances are
not the only factors which may be considered in determining the
criminal purpose). It is this very opportunity for arbitrary enforcement
which renders a law unconstitutionally vague. 64 Virtually identical
loitering for prostitution ordinances in other jurisdictions have been
struck down for vagueness. In Brown v. Municipality ofAnchorage,65 the
court held:
62. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171.
63. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170 (citation omitted).
64. See generally Papachristou, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
65. 584 P2d 35 (Alaska 1978).
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A fair reading of [the ordinance] discloses that the or-
dinance on its face gives enforcement officials excessive discre-
tion, inviting by its inexactitude arbitrary enforcement and
uneven application. We can think of no construction which
will save the statute from this infirmity. Therefore, we hold
that [the ordinance] is void for vagueness.66
Likewise, in Christian v. Kansas City,67 the court held: "Based on this
ordinance, this court cannot permit the city to leave the task of dif-
ferentiating between 'casual street encounters' from 'obvious' acts
reflecting the state of mind needed for solicitation to the law enforce-
ment officers and the courts."6 8
Because the Ypsilanti ordinance "impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis," 69 it is unconstitutionally vague and cannot be
enforced.
3. The Ypsilanti Ordinance Unconstitutionally Inhibits
the Exercise of First Amendment Freedoms.
A law is unconstitutionally vague when its uncertain language requires
a person to forego or modify the exercise of his/her First Amendment
freedoms in order to avoid the possibility of being arrested or penalized.
As noted in the discussion regarding overbreadth, the Ypsilanti or-
dinance has exactly that effect. Because an ordinary citizen carnot know
what gestures, speech, or behavior might be interpreted by a police
officer as suspicious, such persons must modify, or forego entirely,
constitutionally protected gestures and speech in order to avoid the risk
of arrest. The ordinance thus is vague and cannot be enforced.
iI. THE YPSILANTI ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT
VIOLATES THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
Although the Ypsilanti ordinance, unlike some of its counterparts in
other states, does not expressly condition an arrest or conviction on
whether the suspect provides a satisfactory explanation of why he/she is
66. Id. at 38.
67. 710 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (per curium).
68. Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
69. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
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in a certain place or what he/she is doing, such a condition is implicit
in the statute. The natural step for an officer to take upon observing
conduct which, under the ordinance, supposedly manifests the criminal
purpose, is to ask the suspect what he/she is doing.70
To the extent this ordinance requires people to explain or justify
their presence in a certain area in order to avoid arrest, it violates the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.71 Even though the
ordinance struck down in Bowden-like the Ypsilanti ordinance-did
not expressly condition arrest or conviction on the presence or absence
of a satisfactory explanation, the court noted in Bowden that this was an
implicit requirement of the statute:
[There are valid arguments for striking it down on the ground
that it violates the privilege against self-incrimination, which the
Cleveland municipal court employed recently to strike down
an ordinance which punished the failure of "suspicious
persons" to give a satisfactory account of themselves to police.
The court said:
"This provision places the burden upon the
citizen of justifying his presence on the public
streets. Any citizen may desire to maintain his pur-
pose for being upon the public streets a matter of
privacy for business, personal or family reasons. [sic]
"To require a citizen to reasonably and satisfac-
torily account for his presence upon the public
streets offends the right to silence guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States."
The Detroit ordinance can similarly be held to offend the
right to silence.72
70. Even the City recognizes the existence of this implicit condition in the ordinance.
In a memo tided "Prostitution Loitering Ordinance," the City Attorney's Office
notes that guidelines for determining whether an arrest should be made include
determining whether there are "other explanations" for the suspicious "conduct,"
such as "hitchhiking," "asking for a ride to Eastern Michigan University," or "car
broke down." Memo by Monika H. Sacks, Ypsilanti City Attorney (March 1, 1990)
(on file with author).
71. City of Detroit v. Bowden, 149 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Mich. Cr. App. 1967).
72. Bowden, 149 N.W.2d at 776-77 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Since Ypsilanti's ordinance effectively requires a person to account
for his/her presence upon the public streets, it offends the "right to
silence guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment," 73 and must be ruled un-
constitutional.
IV. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S ARREST AND SUBSEQUENT CONVIC-
TION UNDER THE YPSILANTI ORDINANCE WAS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AND MUST BE REVERSED.
Even if one assumes that Ypsilanti's loitering for purposes of solicitation
ordinance can be construed narrowly such that it is not unconstitution-
al on its face, it was unconstitutionally applied to Appellant in the
instant case.
A. Officer Mutchler's Arrest of Appellant Was Based on Her
Previous Arrest for Solicitation and Was Unconstitution-
al.
Appellant's arrest by Officer Mutchler clearly was based on only two
things: Appellant's status as a known prostitute, and acts by Appellant
which were otherwise innocent in and of themselves and which are
constitutionally protected. Officer Mutchler testified that he previously
had arrested Appellant for soliciting and that he arrested her on the
evening in question based upon the prior arrest he had made:
Q. . . at what point did you determine to arrest Miss
Patterson and on what factors; could you enunciate
those for the court?
A. The type of walk, the manner of dress, the behavior
entering and exiting the vehicles, leaving and com-
ing back after a short period of time with different
men, and I have to say based on the prior arrest I
made on her myself 74
As noted earlier, it is unconstitutional to penalize a person based
on his or her status: "Status alone is generally insufficient to constitute
a crime."75 Yet Officer Mutchler arrested Appellant based on her status.
73. Bowden, 149 N.W.2d at 776-77.
74. Record at 14 (emphasis added).
75. Profit v. City of Tulsa, 617 P2d 250, 251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (citation
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If Officer Mutchler had not considered Appellant's status, he clearly
would not have had probable cause to arrest her, since the other cir-
cumstances he supposedly relied on to support the arrest (wearing a
bright pink dress, walking at a slow pace, making small hand gestures at
vehicles passing by, getting into two vehicles with single male oc-
cupants) were otherwise innocuous and were constitutionally
protected.76
Under the Fourteenth Amendment 77 and under the due process
clause of Michigan's constitution 78 police are allowed to make arrests
only on probable cause, not on mere suspicion.79 The "non-status"
circumstances involved here at most give rise to only a suspicion of
loitering for purposes of solicitation, which is not enough to substan-
tiate an arrest. Appellant's status was the crucial element on which
Officer Mutchler based his arrest, and as such, the arrest and sub-
sequent conviction were unconstitutional.
B. Appellant's Conviction Was Unconstitutional Because It
Was Based on Acts Which Are Protected Under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution and Article I, Sections Three and Five, of the
Michigan State Constitution.
The trial court ruled that evidence of Appellant's status as a known
prostitute was inadmissible for purposes of establishing guilt under the
ordinance. Given that Appellant's status as a so-called known prostitute
cannot be considered in determining guilt, then the only basis for her
arrest and conviction was her behavior, as recited by Officer Mutchler
in his testimony. That behavior amounted to nothing more or less than
being in a public place, and gesturing to and meeting with others on
the ktreet-expressive and communicative activity which is clearly
protected under the federal and state constitutions.80
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance
of free speech as the cornerstone of democracy by carving out an area
deserving of special protection under the First Amendment: the "public
omitted).
76. Record at 9-11. For further discussion, see infa, part IV.B.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
78. MICH. CoNsr. art. I, § 17.
79. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I, amend. XIV; MICH. (ONs-r. art I, §§ 3, 5.
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forum."81 Those places "historically associated with the free exercise of
expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered,
without more, to be public forums."82 The public forum doctrine
recognizes that while certain property may be publicly owned, an
individual has the right to use such property for the purpose of exercis-
ing the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and petition.8 3 The right to
stand on a street and speak one's mind is the foundation of freedom
and democracy:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have im-
memorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights and liberties of citizens.84
Appellant's acts of gesturing to others on the street, and meeting
with other persons in cars on the street, are classic examples of speech
and assembly in a public forum which are constitutionally protected.
Further, Appellant had a fundamental constitutional right to use the
public sidewalks and streets as she pleased, provided that her use did
not interfere with use by others. "The rights of locomotion, freedom of
movement, to go where one pleases, and to use the public streets in a
way that does not interfere with the personal liberty of others" are
implicit in the First and Fourteenth Amendments.8 5
Convicting Appellant of a crime based on these activities is a
blatant violation of her constitutional rights. The conviction below
81. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
82. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (citing Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976); Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Hague v. Committee for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
83. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
(finding regulation of public property must not abiidge constitutional liberties of
those who are rightfully on the streets); Hague, 307 U.S. 496 (finding unconstitu-
tional an ordinance which interfered with the communication of individuals' views
on the streets).
84. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
85. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 E Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964
(1976).
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must be reversed.
V. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH APPELLANT'S
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she was guilty of loitering
for purposes of soliciting sexual acts for hire. In reviewing this claim,
this Court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution. It then must "determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt." 86 In order to uphold the conviction, the
Court must find that "the evidence was ample to warrant a finding of
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged." 87
In the instant case, the evidence introduced by the prosecution
(and presumably relied on by the trial court in convicting Appellant)
was as follows: Officer Mutchler saw Willie Mae Patterson on the
evening in question walking at a slow pace up and down the
sidewalk.8 8 She was wearing a bright pink dress of mid-thigh length.89
While she was walking, Ms. Patterson was making small hand gestures
at vehicles passing by with male occupants.90 On two occasions, she got
into a car with a single male occupant and left for a short period of
time, then came back. 91 About forty-five minutes before her arrest, she
entered a black Chevrolet and sat there until males drove by, at which
point she got out of the car and resumed walking slowly. 92 Finally,
while Officer Mutchler was taking her photograph after her arrest, Ms.
Patterson allegedly "made an utterance that she was sorry, that she
promised not to work the block anymore, and that if I would let her
go, she ... would go straight home." 93
The elements of the crime which had to have been proven beyond
86. People v. McNeal, 393 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); People v.
Thomas, 337 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (utilizing same language as
McNeal).
87. People v. Williams, 118 N.W2d 391, 395 (Mich. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909
(1963).
88. Record at 9.
89. Record at 9.
90. Record at 10.
91. Record at 11.
92. Record at 10.
93. Record at 16.
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a reasonable doubt in the instant case are twofold: (1) loitering in a
public place; and (2) for the purpose of soliciting acts of prostitution.94
There must be evidence which proves beyond a reasonable doubt each
element of the offense.9s If one looks at the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, one might determine that there was suffi-
cient evidence to find the existence of the first element-that Appellant
was loitering. However, loitering in and of itself is not a crime, and
proof of it cannot also be used to prove illegal intent or purpose:
The word "loiter" has no sinister meaning and, by itself,
implies no wrongdoing or misconduct or engagement in
prohibited practices. Only where the statute or ordinance
clearly distinguishes between conduct calculated to harm or
the prohibited activity on the one hand, and essentially in-
nocent conduct on the other hand, can a conviction be
upheld; and only where such distinctions have been made
have convictions been sustained. 96
In Hodges, the defendant was charged with violating a Detroit code
provision which made it a crime to "knowingly" loiter in any place
where narcotic drugs or equipment for same were sold, furnished, or
stored. The defendant testified that she had come to the premises in
question to borrow hair rollers, had been there for about five to seven
minutes before the police raided the premises, and saw no narcotic
implements on the premises. An arresting officer testified that he saw
narcotic paraphernalia in every room of the premises. 97
Based on that evidence, the trial court in Hodges found the
defendant guilty of violating the ordinance, concluding that knowledge
of the presence of narcotics and/or implements could be inferred from
the other evidence. 98 The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction,
holding that the defendant's conduct was "patently innocent" and that
the prosecution had failed to introduce evidence from which guilty
knowledge could be found.99
The evidence found insufficient in Hodges is strikingly similar to
94. YPsILArN, MICH., CITY CODE § 9.138 (1990-91).
95. City of Detroit v. Hodges, 164 N.W.2d 781, 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
96. Hodges, 164 N.W.2d at 782-83 (citations omitted).
97. Hodges, 164 NV.2d at 782.
98. Hodges, 164 N.W.2d at 782.
99. Hodges, 164 N.W.2d at 783.
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the evidence introduced at trial in the instant case and on which Ap-
pellant's conviction is based. In the case before this Court, Appellant's
conduct was "patently innocent." She was walking on the street, wear-
ing a brightly colored dress, gesturing to passers-by who happened to be
male. This behavior is consistent with any number of perfectly
legitimate and lawful activities, including that which Appellant testified
to-that she had a car breakdown and was looking for assistance.
There was absolutely no evidence introduced at trial which
demonstrated the requisite intent or purpose of soliciting sexual acts in
exchange for payment. 100 The officer did not hear anything that was
said by Appellant or by others with whom she spoke. He did not see
any exchange of money or property from which one arguably could
infer that Appellant was offering sexual acts in exchange for payment.
In fact, the officer did not see any communicative behavior by Ap-
pellant which even remotely suggested that she was there to solicit
sexual activity at all, much less for pay; he did not report that she made
any sexually suggestive gestures to the all-important single males passing
by. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that there was ample
evidence to warrant a finding that Appellant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of being in the area for the purpose of soliciting
sexual acts for hire.
Cases decided in other jurisdictions under essentially the same
statutes have held such evidence to be insufficient to sustain conviction.
In analogous fact circumstances, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction of a woman who had been found guilty
of "inviting for the purposes of prostitution," because the evidence did
not prove the criminal purpose beyond a reasonable doubt. 0 1 In Graves
v. United States,'02 the government adopted the same argument that the
prosecution adopted in the case at bar. As summarized by the Graves
court:
The government replies that the totality of the observed
events-appellants' presence in an area known for prostitu-
tion, their repeated beckoning to passing motorists and
100. In this regard, one must keep in mind that it is not sufficient for the prosecution to
show only that Appellant was soliciting sexual activity, for it is not a crime under
the ordinance to loiter for the purpose of engaging in non-compensable sexual
activity. The prosecution's burden was to prove that Appellant was there in order to
solicit sexual acts for payment.
iol. Graves v. United States, 515 A.2d 1136, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
102. 515 A.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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pedestrians, their focus exclusively on males, and their jointly
impeding a male pedestrian whom [one of appellants] grabbed
in the groin while [the other appellant] stood next to
her--can create only one legitimate inference: that appellants
were soliciting for the purpose of prostitution. We disagree.
Absent appellants' prior convictions, the totality of the cir-
cumstances reasonably implies, at most, that [one appellant]
was, and [the other appellant] may have been, soliciting sexual
acts. However, absent evidence of consideration-e.g, an over-
heard conversation with language implying sex for money, or an
observation of money tendered or exchanging hands-the evidence
is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants'
conduct was for a commercial purpose.10 3
The one difference between the facts in Graves and the facts in the
instant case actually mitigates against a finding of guilt in the instant
case. In Graves, one of the defendants made a sexually suggestive ges-
ture from which an observer might conclude that the defendant was
seeking to engage in sexual activity. 1 4 Even the presence of that factor,
however, was not enough to sustain a finding that the defendant was
seeking sexual activity for hire. Where, as here, there is no such sexually
suggestive gesture, the evidence clearly cannot sustain a conviction of
loitering with an intent to solicit prostitution.
Likewise, in Dickerson v. City of Richmond,1'" the Court of Appeals
of Virginia held that circumstantial evidence of a male defendant's
intent to solicit prostitution is insufficient to support conviction if it
only creates a "suspicion of guilt": 10 6
That Dickerson appeared to be dressed in female attire,
as the detectives and the trial court concluded, and seemed to
be drawn to only those vehicles with male occupants create a
suspicion that his purpose in loitering was sexual in nature.
Unlike the "direct statements, indirect suggestions, and sala-
cious innuendoes" made by the defendant in Pederson,
however, the City's evidence does not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Dickerson's intent was prostitution or
103. Graves, 515 A.2d at 1146 (emphasis added).
104. Graves, 515 A.2d at 1146.
105. 346 S.E.2d 333, (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
106. Id. at 335.
1993]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
other conduct of a lewd, lascivious or indecent nature. The
evidence, however, must prove that Dickerson's specific intent
was to engage in prostitution....
We conclude that the evidence, when viewed in a light
most favorable to the City, did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Dickerson's actions manifested the purpose of
engaging in prostitution or soliciting or engaging in other
lewd, lascivious or indecent acts. Because one of the two
elements of the ordinance was not proved, the evidence was
not sufficient and the conviction must be reversed. 107
In the instant case, the prosecution argued that the fact-finder
could infer the criminal intent from the circumstantial evidence recited
by Officer Mutchler. In the absence of any direct evidence of intent,
such an inference was impermissible. "An inference of criminality may
be drawn from circumstantial evidence only if it follows 'as an impell-
ing certainty.' "108 The circumstantial evidence in the case before this
Court, as noted earlier, is at least as consistent with innocent conduct
as it is with criminal conduct. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that an inference of criminal intent arises with impelling certainty.
Accordingly, a finding of criminal intent or purpose was not justified by
the evidence. Appellant's conviction must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The loitering for purposes of prostitution ordinance enacted by the City
of Ypsilanti is grossly violative of the constitutional guarantees of free
speech, due process, and the right of silence. If allowed to stand, it will
result "in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted
to 'stand on a public sidewalk ... only at the whim of any police
officer.' "109 The City of Ypsilanti cannot be allowed to solve its
perceived law-enforcement problems by trampling on the constitutional
rights of persons who find themselves within its jurisdiction. Further,
the manner in which this ordinance was applied to Appellant was
107. Id. at 336-37 (distinguishing Pederson v. City of Richmond, 254 S.E.2d 95 (Va.
1979) from case at point (citations omitted)).
108. People v. Young, 282 N.W.2d 211, 215, (Mich. Cc. App. 1979) (quoting People v.
Davenport, 197 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
109. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (citation omitted).
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unconstitutional. Finally, the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient
to support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. t

